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SPLITTING THE BILL: CREATING A NATIONAL 
CAR INSURANCE FUND TO PAY FOR 
ACCIDENTS IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Carrie Schroll 
ABSTRACT—While self-driving cars may seem like something that can 
exist only in a futuristic movie, the technology is developing rapidly, and 
many states already allow test runs of self-driving cars on state roads. 
Many car companies have announced that they will make self-driving cars 
available as early as 2020. However, several manufacturers of the self-
driving car technology predict that personal ownership of vehicles will be 
replaced by a car-sharing system, where companies own the self-driving 
cars and rent them to consumers who pay per use. With more widespread 
introduction of this technology comes many questions about how to assess 
liability for accidents involving self-driving cars, and how insurance should 
be structured to pay for those accidents. This Note discusses the potential 
parties who could be held liable: drivers, car-sharing companies, and 
manufacturers. This Comment suggests the elimination of liability for any 
accidents involving self-driving cars, and recommends the creation of a 
National Insurance Fund to pay for all damages resulting from those 
accidents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Self-driving cars may seem like something straight out of a sci-fi 
movie. But as death rates from car accidents remain high, more and more 
car companies are developing self-driving cars in an attempt to increase 
safety in driving. In 2011, 29,867 fatal motor vehicle crashes in the United 
States resulted in 32,479 deaths.1 Roughly 15 of every 100,000 licensed 
drivers died in a car accident in 2011.2 Some form of human error causes 
approximately 95% of all car accidents.3 In an effort to reduce accidents, 
automobile companies are inventing new technologies that increasingly 
automate driving. These technologies include collision-mitigating braking 
 
1 Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
Encyclopedia, NCSA DATA RESOURCE WEBSITE, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx 
[hereinafter FARS Encyclopedia] [http://perma.cc/33KF-QBDQ].  
2 Id.  
3 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 059, 
NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 23–26 (2008) 
[hereinafter NMVCCS Report], available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811059.PDF 
[http://perma.cc/8N3H-5T64]. 
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systems and lane-keeping systems, which temporarily take control away 
from humans to rectify human errors and prevent accidents.4 
Some companies are beginning to create fully autonomous vehicles 
(AVs). These cars are completely automated and rely very minimally on 
humans for their operation. Google is at the forefront of creating AVs, but 
many large car companies are also planning to incorporate AVs into their 
fleets within the next decade.5 Google touts these AVs as having the 
potential to almost entirely eliminate human error, reducing automobile 
accidents by 90%.6 
Regardless of the extent to which automobile accidents will decline 
overall as more AVs replace human-operated cars, the use of AVs will, at a 
minimum, decrease the percentage of accidents caused by humans while 
increasing the percentage of accidents caused by product defects and 
malfunctions. In the current system, approximately 94% of accidents are 
caused by human error and less than 6% are caused by product defects,7 
but, in a new system dominated by AVs, those numbers are likely to 
reverse.8 
One prediction is that private car ownership will be replaced by 
extensive car-sharing and carpooling in AVs due to the cost of private 
ownership of AVs.9 Car-sharing companies will own a fleet of AVs that 
people can rent as they need and can pay for based on the amount of 
usage—resembling Zipcar, only on a larger scale.10 People would send in a 
 
4 Julie Goodrich, Comment, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS. 
L. REV. 265, 269–70 (2013). 
5 Will Knight, Driverless Cars Are Further Away Than You Think, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 22, 
2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520431/driverless-cars-are-further-away-than-
you-think/ [http://perma.cc/7RUW-ZJFL]; Damon Lavrinc, Nissan Promises to Deliver Autonomous 
Car by 2020, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/08/nissan-autonomous-
drive/ [http://perma.cc/E93D-NBBF]. 
6 Chunka Mui, Fasten Your Seatbelts: Google’s Driverless Car is Worth Trillions (Part 1), 
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2013/01/22/fasten-your-
seatbelts-googles-driverless-car-is-worth-trillions/ [http://perma.cc/W8P7-DR2U]. 
7 Percentages were calculated using data from NMVCCS Report, supra note 3, at 24–26. Table 
9(a) lists accidents that were caused by human error, which totaled 5096. The twenty-four accidents 
caused by “glare” from Table 9(c) were added to that total because glare only causes accidents by 
impairing human vision—a problem that would be solved by driverless vehicles—giving us a total of 
5120 accidents caused by humans. This number was divided by the total number of accidents in the 
study, which was 5471, giving us 93.6% (rounded to 94% for simplicity) caused by human error and 
leaving us with 6.4% (rounded to 6% for simplicity) caused by product defects and other factors. 
8 See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous 
Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2012). 
9 Todd Wilms, Google Driverless Car: Why You Will Probably Never Own One, FORBES (Oct. 
23, 2013, 12:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2013/10/23/google-driverless-car-why-you-will-
probably-never-own-one/ [http://perma.cc/R4YA-CUWS]. 
10 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
806 
request with their location, their destination, and the time they need to 
arrive at their destination.11 The company would coordinate large-scale 
carpooling with others who have similar requests. This will further reduce 
the number of drivers on the road, which in turn will reduce accidents. 
The overall number of accidents should decline as more AVs enter the 
roads. However, there will still be traffic accidents, and the current civil 
liability and automobile insurance systems are not designed to deal with the 
changes that AVs will present.12 Much has been written about how to 
change the liability and insurance systems to respond to accidents in 
privately owned AVs.13 This Note instead addresses how the legal system 
and automobile insurance framework will need to change to address 
accidents when car-sharing and carpooling in AVs owned by a third-party 
company is the norm. This Note assumes that car-sharing will be 
widespread, but, even small-scale car-sharing will create similar legal 
issues. This Note also assumes near universal AV use and largely does not 
address issues that will arise during the transition period from human-
operated cars to AVs. 
Part I discusses the current causes of automobile accidents and how an 
increase in AV use will change which causes predominate. Part I also 
briefly describes the technology behind AVs. Part II outlines how 
automobile accidents are currently addressed by civil lawsuits and 
describes the current state of automobile insurance policies. It also 
discusses how accidents in Zipcars and rental cars are currently managed. 
Part III shows several possible ways that accidents in AVs could be 
addressed and the drawbacks of each. These ways include the riders, the 
company that owns the car, or the manufacturer of the car paying for 
damages. 
Part IV suggests a creative solution that evenly spreads the burden 
among the various actors mentioned in Part III. It recommends setting up a 
national fund run by the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration into which each actor pays a monthly tax. When accidents 
occur, injured riders can file claims for medical expenses, and the car-
 
11 Id. 
12 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1327–28. 
13 See, e.g., NIDHI KALRA ET AL., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FHWA/CA/TL-CA09-
1664, LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES (2009), available at 
http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/researchreports/reports/2009/prr-2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle
_final_report_2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/QS47-Q5M5]; Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, 
Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453 (2013); 
Andrew P. Garza, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 
46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2012); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1327–28; Goodrich, supra note 
4. 
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sharing companies can file claims for property damages. The system would 
operate similarly to current governmental funds like Medicare and Social 
Security, where the government organizes payments as needed and resolves 
disputed claims through preestablished mechanisms. This Note concludes 
by suggesting that the federal government begin to consider how to address 
the changes that AVs will necessitate, so that these safer cars can enter the 
market as soon as manufacturers are ready to sell them. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CAR CRASHES AND THE ARRIVAL OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGY 
A. Current Statistics for Automobile Accidents 
Automobile accidents are one of the leading causes of death in the 
United States and are the leading cause of death for teenagers in the United 
States.14 Advances in safety have cut down on the number of accidents, as 
well as the number of fatalities and injuries from these accidents. For 
example, 37,526 fatal crashes happened in the United States in the year 
2000, and 41,945 people died as a result of those crashes.15 Those numbers 
dropped by more than 20% by the year 2011.16 However, even with these 
reductions, very large numbers of accidents still occur each year, with 
estimates around 10.8 million accidents in the United States in 2009.17 
The overwhelming majority of accidents result from human error. The 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducted 
the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVCCS), which 
looked at a sample of 5471 automobile crashes in a two-and-a-half-year 
period between July 2005 and December 2007.18 Of those 5471 crashes, 
93% were caused by human error, and only 2% were caused by a product 
defect.19 In addition, in some instances roadway conditions caused a human 
to err in driving and crash, which raises the number of human-caused 
crashes even higher.20 
 
14 Teen Drivers Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers_factsheet.html [http://perma.cc/GB9Z-
7ZVE]. 
15 FARS Encyclopedia, supra note 1. 
16 In 2011, there were 29,867 fatal crashes and 32,479 deaths. Id. 
17 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 693 (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/trans.pdf [http://perma.cc/JD7E-MF2G]. 
18 NMVCCS Report, supra note 3, at 4. 
19 5096 crashes were attributed to human error, 135 to roadway and atmospheric conditions, 
130 to the vehicle itself, and 110 did not have an easily determinable cause. Id. at 25–26. 
20 These conditions include glare or obstacles blocking a driver’s view. Id. at 26. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
808 
The types of human error that cause automobile accidents vary. In the 
NMVCCS crashes, 41% of accidents caused by human error resulted from 
“recognition errors.”21 “Decision errors” resulted in 34% of human-caused 
crashes.22 Another 10% of human-caused crashes resulted from 
performance errors such as overcompensation and poor directional 
control.23 Finally, 7% of human-caused crashes resulted from 
nonperformance errors, like falling asleep at the wheel or having a heart 
attack.24 
For the 2% of crashes attributed to the vehicle, the NMVCCS did not 
address how many were due in part or in full to poor maintenance, vehicle 
misuse by the owner, or both.25 Vehicle problems can come from either an 
inherent product defect or from improper use or care by the owner, so some 
of the vehicle defects can themselves be attributed to human error. Thus, 
having humans operate automobiles is the leading cause for 93% of 
accidents. 
B. How Autonomous Vehicles Work 
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) will take control of automobiles almost 
entirely out of the hands of the human driver. A person will need to tell the 
car’s system where to go, but after that, he can completely relinquish 
control to the car.26 The car will do everything that a human operator would 
need to do to get from point A to point B.27 
Sebastian Thrun, one of the lead developers of Google’s self-driving 
car, predicted that replacing all current cars with AVs would reduce traffic 
accidents by 90%.28 Based on the NMVCCS’s estimate that crashes are 
caused 93% of the time by human error, Thrun’s prediction does not seem 
that outlandish. Many of the human causes of accidents that the NMVCCS 
outlined will disappear when an AV is used. In particular, human 
deficiencies in vision and reaction time are eliminated by the new 
 
21 Recognition errors include things like inadequate surveillance—meaning not looking where a 
driver is going—and internal distractions, such as cell phones. Id. at 24. 
22 These include going too fast, misjudging distances between cars, making illegal maneuvers, 
and aggressive driving. Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 24–25. 
25 Id. at 25–26. 
26 See Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011, 
9:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/how-google-self-driving-
car-works [http://perma.cc/W73A-VESZ]. 
27 For a demonstration of all the tasks the AV can do, see Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve 
Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE&noredirect=1 
[http://perma.cc/Z5X7-QHK7].  
28 Mui, supra note 6. 
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technology.29 The AVs use sensors, cameras, and a laser range finder, along 
with compiled data to have a much more detailed and accurate picture of 
their surroundings in real time than a person possibly could.30 
Additionally, AVs will share data with each other in real time, so the 
cars will have better knowledge of dangerous situations than humans do. 
For example, once one AV crosses over a patch of black ice and makes 
note of it, all other AVs connected to the same data will become aware in 
advance that a certain area of road is dangerous.31 This will allow AVs to 
either avoid those areas or proceed much more cautiously than would a 
person. 
AV technology is expensive, so some have predicted that large-scale 
car-sharing and carpooling in AVs will replace private ownership as a less 
expensive travel option.32 The system would be a combination of the car-
sharing aspects of Zipcar,33 the car-on-demand nature of Uber,34 and the 
ride-sharing programs that currently exist in many large cities.35 A 
company would own a fleet of AVs, people would register online to 
become members (as with Zipcar or Uber),36 and a car would arrive at the 
time and place a user designates.37 Like Zipcar, it would be a pay-per-use 
system and would likely be less expensive than ownership of AVs, which 
thus far have been priced at several hundred thousand dollars.38 
 
29 For a full description of the sensors and other technology the AV uses, see Guizzo, supra 
note 26. 
30 Id. 
31 See Sebastian Thrun, Leave the Driving to the Car, and Reap Benefits in Safety and Mobility, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D4. 
32 See, e.g., Emily Badger, What Will Happen to Public Transit in a World Full of Autonomous 
Cars?, ATLANTIC CITYLAB (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2014/01/what-
will-happen-public-transit-world-full-autonomous-cars/8131/ [http://perma.cc/R8X7-YPDJ]; Wilms, 
supra note 9. 
33 ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ [http://perma.cc/KL5U-MG2V] (detailing how Zipcar owns 
cars that it leaves parked around a city for members to pay to use as needed). 
34 UBER, https://www.uber.com/ [http://perma.cc/C83G-2JW4] (describing the Uber on-
demand taxi service, which allows members to make a request using a smartphone app for a taxi that 
arrives shortly thereafter at the designated location). 
35 E.g., Seth Kugel, Calling Shotgun: Ride-Share Services, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at TR4; 
Mark Berman, SideCar, a New Ride-Sharing Service, Arrives in D.C., WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2013/03/22/sidecar-a-new-ride-sharing-service-
arrives-in-d-c/ [http://perma.cc/3ZW9-NVU9]. 
36 See Wilms, supra note 9. 
37 See id. 
38 See Ashley Hasley III, Driverless Cars: 15 Things You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Aug. 
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/driverless-cars-15-things-you-
need-to-know/2014/08/25/786c6fbc-d79b-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html [http://perma.cc/3EA3-
CP7P]; Wilms, supra note 9. 
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Additionally, the car-sharing system would be coupled with 
carpooling to reduce the overall number of cars needed. The car-sharing 
company would coordinate carpooling by finding requests from people in 
similar locations needing to go to similar destinations around the same 
time.39 The ride sharing that is currently coordinated by neighbors would be 
computerized to find the most efficient carpooling options.40 Google aspires 
to decrease the number of cars on the road by as much as 90%, and this 
aspiration could prove true if car-sharing coupled with carpooling becomes 
the norm.41 Such a dramatic decline in the number of cars on the road 
would cause a significant decline in accidents.42 
There will still be accidents even if AVs are the only cars on the road. 
The technology can never be perfect and—as anyone with a computer 
knows—technology can sometimes crash or malfunction. The legal system 
will need to adapt to provide avenues for those injured in accidents to seek 
relief from whoever is responsible, whether it is the driver, the 
manufacturer, or someone else. 
II. THE CURRENT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE SYSTEMS AS THEY 
RELATE TO AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 
Both the current legal framework for determining civil liability for 
accidents and the insurance framework for paying for accidents evolved 
over time to respond to the realities of car accidents—namely that one of 
the human drivers in the accident is likely at fault. The current systems are 
efficient because the party most likely at fault for the accident (a human 
operator) is the one who is initially sued and who pays for insurance.43 For 
accidents involving cars not owned by the at-fault driver, the situation is 
very similar because the person in control of preventing the accident is still 
the driver, not the owner.44 As will be discussed in Part III, if car-sharing of 
AVs becomes the norm and the causes of automobile accidents shift away 
from human error, holding liable the people sitting in the car is no longer 
clearly the best option. Instead, car-sharing companies and manufacturers 
should hold some liability.   
 
39 This is how SideCar already organizes ride sharing. See Berman, supra note 35.  
40 Id. 
41 See Mui, supra note 6. 
42 Though fatal accidents are more likely on emptier roads, more accidents occur overall in 
areas with the highest population densities. Where Car Accidents Happen Most, ESURANCE, 
http://www.esurance.com/claims-info/accident-info/where-accidents-happen-most [http://perma.cc/
89L9-66MP]. 
43 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. 
44 The Graves Amendment shields the owner from liability. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012). 
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A. The Current Automobile Accident Liability System 
After an accident occurs, there are several ways the parties involved 
could allocate cost. The drivers could agree on both who is at fault and how 
much that person should compensate the other for the damages without 
litigation. The drivers determine fault and damages and either use their 
insurance coverage to pay the costs or pay out of pocket.45 Some states 
have passed legislation barring people from commencing personal injury 
suits where the damages are below a certain level.46 This “no-fault system” 
requires that a threshold level of damages be met; otherwise neither party is 
declared to be at fault, and each party is responsible for its own damages.47 
Because fault is not established in these cases, the parties usually rely on 
their first-party insurance to cover their damages.48 
However, the majority of states do not have a no-fault system,49 so 
when there is a dispute, drivers can initiate legal proceedings to resolve it. 
One driver alleges that the negligent actions of the other driver caused 
damages.50 This occurs because “[i]n the vast majority of crashes, we 
ascribe blame to one or more drivers rather than to design features of the 
car.”51 
To prove the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff needs to show a 
breach of the duty of care and proximate causation between that breach and 
the plaintiff’s damages.52 In some cases, both drivers are at least somewhat 
negligent.53 After determining fault, the finder of fact also must decide the 
amount of damages.54 Personal injury cases are the most common cases that 
arise from automobile accidents because, as shown above, human error is 
overwhelmingly the primary cause of accidents, and therefore, who was 
negligent and how much the party owes are the two main questions that 
arise in a human-caused accident. 
 
45 Cf. KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. 
46 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117 (2013); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5102, 5104 (Consol. 2013). 
47 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
662 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2005); KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18–19.  
48 See ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 725. 
49 Id. at 726. 
50 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 20. 
51 Id. 
52 4-12 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, 
DAMAGES § 12.01 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2014). 
53 See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 9 (2010). 
54 4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 12.72; see also Sanchez v. King, 932 S.W.2d 
177, 180–82 (Tex. App. 1996) (discussing the doctor’s testimony and medical records the jury used to 
assess damages). 
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In car accidents that result from a car defect, the driver can either join 
the manufacturer of the car as a party to the accident’s lawsuit, or sue the 
manufacturer after the first personal injury suit to recover the money the 
defendant paid to the plaintiff in damages.55 In these cases, the driver 
claiming a defect must prove two things: (1) that a defect existed that 
caused the accident;56 and (2) that the driver did not know about the defect 
and that there was no improper care or use of the vehicle that led to the 
defect.57 Currently, successful product defect cases related to car accidents 
are fairly rare in part because it is unlikely that a defect, rather than a 
human, caused the accident. 
When an accident involves a car that the driver does not own, the legal 
system treats it largely the same. The driver, and not the rental or car-
sharing company, is still held liable for negligence. Congress passed the 
Graves Amendment for the purpose of shielding rental car companies from 
liability.58 Owners are not liable unless they commit negligence or criminal 
wrongdoing that causes the accident.59 The Graves Amendment also covers 
car-sharing companies, such as Zipcar.60 The Amendment recognizes that 
the company that owns the car is not as able to avoid accidents as the 
driver, and likely was not the cause of the accident, and thus should not be 
held liable. 
The current legal system logically aligns with the cause of most 
accidents: human error. The expense of maintaining the suit rests on the 
two drivers, one of whom is likely at fault and is going to be responsible in 
the end for paying damages. Similarly, the burdens are correctly placed on 
the drivers to show that their accident is one of the rare cases where a 
 
55 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (describing 
how plaintiff sued General Motors for the defect that led their gas tank to explode during an accident), 
abrogated by Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998).  
56 See, e.g., Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2002); Holloway v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 250 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. 1977) (stating that without evidence 
showing design defect or improper assembly, a directed verdict for the manufacturer should be 
affirmed), rev’d on reh’g, 271 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1978). 
57 See 4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 12.31; see also Jarvis, 283 F.3d at 40 
(describing defendant’s evidence both of the driver’s failure to inspect the brakes and that there was no 
defect); Holloway, 250 N.W.2d at 739–40. 
58  49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012) (“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a 
person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political 
subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm 
to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during 
the period of the rental or lease . . . .”). 
59 See Carton v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that owners of leased vehicles are only liable for negligent or criminal failure to maintain the car). 
60 Moreau v. Josaphat, 975 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Minto v. Zipcar N.Y., Inc., 
No. 15401/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010). 
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manufacturing defect exists, as opposed to forcing the manufacturer to 
prove in every case that the accident is not one of the rare instances of 
defect. 
B. The Current Automobile Insurance System 
Automobile insurance law and insurance policies also function in 
ways that reflect the reality of car-accident causes. All states have 
legislation requiring automobile insurance be purchased, and most states 
require liability insurance as opposed to first-party insurance.61 Almost all 
insurance policies, however, include some amount of first-party insurance 
coverage along with liability insurance coverage. There are multiple types 
of first-party insurance: collision coverage for property damages,62 MedPay 
coverage for medical expenses,63 and Uninsured Motorist insurance.64 The 
liability insurance coverage pays for damages to someone else’s person or 
property when the insured is at fault for an accident. 
As mentioned above, some states have created no-fault systems for 
automobile accidents. A no-fault system changes the normal tort liability 
system in two ways: (1) by setting thresholds of seriousness for damages 
that must be met before a person can bring a personal injury suit for an 
accident; and (2) by using first-party personal injury protection (PIP) 
insurance instead of liability insurance to cover the cost of damages in any 
accident where a suit is barred.65 In no-fault systems, the state requires each 
driver to carry a certain amount of PIP insurance to cover their damages.66 
Some scholars have suggested that an entirely no-fault system where 
all drivers have first-party insurance coverage and pay for their own 
damages might adequately deal with the introduction of AVs to the road.67 
It is important to understand the reasons that states have been reluctant to 
institute a no-fault system to comprehend why no-fault may also not be 
supported as a way to address AV accidents. 
The main reason states have not adopted a no-fault system is because 
it places strict liability on the victim for the accident. Many argue that 
 
61 ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 662; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4009 (2014). But 
see TEX. INS. CODE § 1952.152 (2013) (requiring motor vehicle insurance policies to provide first-party 
personal injury protection unless the insured objects in writing). 
62 ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 697. 
63 MARSHALL S. SHAPO & RICHARD J. PELTZ, TORT AND INJURY LAW 842 (Carolina Academic 
Press, 3d ed. 2006). 
64 Id. 
65 ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 725. 
66 Id. 
67 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 21. 
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placing strict liability on victims, as opposed to punishing the at-fault 
driver, will incentivize drivers to be more reckless because they are not on 
the hook for paying for damages caused by their actions.68 This concern 
does not carry over to a no-fault system for AVs because the passengers do 
not “operate” the car and, therefore, cannot operate it recklessly. Another 
argument against no-fault is that having strict liability for victims runs 
counter to ideas of fairness and corrective justice: that the person who 
caused an accident and damages should be held responsible so that the 
victim can be made whole again, and the negligent actions can be deterred 
in the future.69 If no-fault systems were used to resolve accidents involving 
AVs, this fairness concern would still exist. 
One difference that a rented or shared car creates in accidents is who 
holds the insurance. Rental companies and car-sharing companies carry 
minimum levels of liability and first-party insurance for their cars so that 
uninsured renters have some coverage.70 This coverage, however, is often 
insufficient to pay for all damages, so drivers have to cover the remaining 
cost.71 As the number of car-sharing companies and the use of shared AVs 
increase, so too will the number of accidents that involve a car owned by 
someone other than the passengers within. The system will have to adapt to 
address this change. 
The current requirement that car owners purchase mandatory liability 
insurance is sensible because it insures that victims are compensated and 
drivers are not bankrupted by accidents. However, if AVs reduce accidents 
to a minimum and if liability for those accidents shifts away from drivers to 
other parties, new forms of car insurance will be needed. Part IV discusses 
a National Car Insurance Fund as one way to share the cost of damages 
among all involved parties. 
III. THREE POSSIBLE WAYS TO ALLOCATE BLAME AND EXPENSES FOR 
ACCIDENTS AND THEIR DRAWBACKS 
The current literature on AV accidents focuses on two general 
categories of people who could be held liable for accidents involving AVs: 
owner–operators and manufacturers.72 In deciding who should be liable 
where there is widespread car-sharing instead of private ownership, the 
options change slightly. Whereas with private ownership, the owner and 
 
68 ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 726; SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 855.  
69 ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 726; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 21 n.4. 
70 Ron Lieber, Consider Worst Case with Zipcar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at B1. 
71 Id. 
72 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–29; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280. 
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the operator are the same, with car-sharing, the owner is the company who 
rents out the car, and the operators are all of the riders in a car at the time of 
the accident. This creates three main sources for assigning liability: riders, 
car-sharing companies, and manufacturers. 
A. Drivers–Riders 
As discussed above, currently liability rests predominantly on drivers 
because one or both drivers in an accident are most likely at fault for it. 
One option for AVs is to keep this status quo and continue to hold drivers 
responsible for damages. Who exactly is the “driver” or “operator” is the 
first problem posed by continuing the status quo.73 One option is that the 
person in the driver’s seat should be the operator because she is in the best 
position to use any kind of manual override for the autonomous driving 
software.74 However, the person in the driver’s seat may not be aware when 
a malfunction occurs and thus may not be able to prevent the accident.75 In 
a carpooling situation, holding the person in the driver’s seat liable makes 
liability more about the luck of the draw (who happens to sit there that day) 
than about fault. 
Another option, then, is to hold all riders in the car equally liable. This 
eliminates the issue of unluckiness, and it recognizes the reality that no one 
in the car is truly “operating” it.76 Each rider has the same amount of 
control over whether the car malfunctions (i.e., no control at all) and so a 
distinction between passengers and drivers is unwarranted, and all riders 
should be considered operators equally.77 
There are several reasons to hold all riders responsible. First, there is 
an assumption of risk argument for placing liability on the riders.78 The 
riders understand that there is a risk of the technology malfunctioning and 
causing an accident, but they decide to take on that risk because the benefit 
 
73 Several state legislatures have offered different solutions to the problem of whether 
passengers in a car that is “operating” itself can still be called and considered “operators.” Goodrich, 
supra note 4, at 288, 290–91. 
74 See id. at 287–88, 290–91. 
75 Currently, when there is a product defect that leads to an accident, the driver is not 
responsible even though the driver has more control over the car than an AV user. See KALRA ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 27–31. It would not make sense to change this rule to hold a driver responsible for not 
stopping an accident that comes from a product defect of an AV if the driver is not currently responsible 
for that type of accident. 
76 See Goodrich, supra note 4, at 288 (suggesting legislators create a distinction between 
operating an AV—punching in directions but then letting it drive on its own—and operating it in a 
meaningful way—taking over control manually). 
77 See id. 
78 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1336. 
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of using the car outweighs the risk.79 Because the riders consented to the 
risk of accident to get the benefits of AVs, under assumption of risk, they 
would be barred from recovering from someone else, and instead would 
have to pay for damages.80 
Another argument for placing liability on the riders is that it is easier 
for the few people riding in the car to resolve the issues from an accident 
than it is to coordinate with manufacturers. Those involved in the accident 
are more likely to be local if they are users of a particular local car-sharing 
company, whereas a manufacturer is less likely to have a local headquarters 
that deals with products liability claims.81 It would be more time efficient to 
resolve the problem at the individual level without involving larger 
companies because the individuals are more likely to live close to each 
other, be able to meet face-to-face, and not have to navigate through the 
corporate structure to find the appropriate person to speak with. 
There are several ways that liability could be assessed to riders. First, 
the riders in the car that caused the accident could be held jointly and 
severally liable for all of the damages that result from the accident. This 
includes bodily injuries to the riders in both cars and property damages to 
both cars. Alternatively, the riders in the at-fault car could pay for 
everything except the medical bills of the passengers in the other car, which 
could be paid for by first-party insurance. There are many ways that 
damages could be split while still holding the riders in the at-fault car the 
most liable. 
Second, all AV users could carry first-party insurance. When an 
accident occurred, it would not matter which car was at-fault. Instead, each 
rider would pay for his or her own medical expenses using first-party 
insurance. Additionally, the riders in each car would be jointly and 
severally liable for the property damages to the car they rode in and would 
have to pay those damages to the company who owns the car. 
There are drawbacks that apply to all of these methods of assessing 
liability on riders. It essentially creates a no-fault or strict liability system 
because the riders are not in a position to avoid the product malfunction. As 
 
79 2-10 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 10.02(b)(ii) (“By voluntarily entering into a 
situation where there are well-known, incidental risks, the plaintiff consents to look out for himself or 
herself and relieves the defendant of any duty.”). 
80 Id. 
81 The primary legal departments that would address products suits tend to be located at 
company headquarters and not all over the country. See, e.g., People: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 
MARTINDALE, http://www.martindale.com/Profile/ProfilePeopleIndex.aspx?orgId=233667 [http://
perma.cc/7U5J-HS78] (showing that Toyota’s main legal department is located in Torrance, 
California). 
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mentioned in Part II, no-fault systems have not been widely adopted.82 The 
public strongly dislikes punishing those who are not at fault and who did 
not engage in any negative behavior that needs to be deterred.83 
Additionally, riders are not in a position to make driving safer in the way 
they are when they are actually operating and controlling the vehicle. In 
contrast, manufacturers are in the best position to make the cars safer,84 but 
they will have no incentive to actually do so if they are never liable for the 
accidents caused by their unsafe products. Because riders cannot make the 
product safer and prevent similar accidents from recurring, there is little 
rationale in current personal injury law to create a no-fault system. 
Along the same lines, holding riders liable sets up the wrong 
incentives. Society should want people to use AVs because they are safer 
vehicles and result in fewer accidents.85 If potential riders know they will 
be liable regardless of fault on their part, they may choose not to participate 
in the car-sharing system at all because of views that strict liability is 
unfair.86 For AV use to become widespread, the legal system needs to be 
structured in a way that encourages individuals to try AVs in the first place. 
If individuals are concerned about the cost to them of an accident because 
they are held strictly liable for all damages, then demand will be 
insufficient to encourage manufacturers to make the cars and car-sharing 
companies to lease them.87 
Placing the cost of damages on riders also raises the problem that 
riders generally have less money than the manufacturers. On the one hand, 
this may not seem like a problem because drivers are currently held liable. 
However, in the current system, drivers are also at fault for the accidents 
and better able to prevent them, so these reasons justify having them pay 
even if it frequently results in skyrocketing insurance premiums or 
financial hardship for defendants.88 In the new system, though, where 
 
82 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 3. 
83 Id. at 33 (stating that no-fault is met with skepticism because one of the main purposes of tort 
law is corrective justice). 
84 See infra Part III.C. 
85 Dana M. Mele, The Quasi-Autonomous Car as an Assistive Device for Blind Drivers: 
Overcoming Liability and Regulatory Barriers, 28 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 27 (2013). 
86 There is evidence in other legal areas that participation is linked to perception of fairness. See 
Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of Fairness in the U.S. 
Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 764 (2005) (stating that citizens are more likely to follow the 
law when they view legal authorities and legislative decisions as fair). 
87 One could argue that shifting some of the cost to car-sharing companies and manufacturers 
will disincentivize them as well. See infra Part IV.B for discussion of this potential problem. 
88 In fact, in the current system, many people view plaintiffs’ products liability suits as an 
attempt to go after deeper pockets instead of the party truly at fault. Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, 
at 1329.  
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drivers are not at fault, there is no negative behavior by riders that justifies 
punishment. For those who believe that the manufacturer is either at fault 
for malfunctions or in a better position to prevent malfunctions, it is more 
sensible to have manufacturers pay damages both because they are more 
blameworthy and because they likely have more capital.89 In general, the 
articles discussing who should be liable in AV accidents regard blaming 
“drivers” as the worst option because of the drawbacks pointed out above.90 
B. The Car-Sharing Companies 
Unlike a scenario of widespread private AV ownership, the car-
sharing scenario separates the owner of the car from the “operator” of the 
car. These owners are another potential actor on whom liability could fall 
when an accident occurs. As with drivers, there are several different ways 
that these companies could pay the costs of an accident. They could be held 
liable for all damages that occur anytime one of their cars malfunctions and 
is at fault. Other variations could have the company pay for only part of the 
damages. For example, each company could be responsible only for the 
damage to their car and the people within it. This would be like a no-fault 
system where the company holds first-party insurance for all of its cars and 
riders.91 Similar to drivers, there are many ways that costs could be 
allocated, at varying levels of cost to the company. 
There are a number of reasons to hold car-sharing companies liable. 
First, they are in a somewhat better position than drivers to improve the 
safety of AVs because they can put pressure on manufacturers by their car-
buying decisions. If they need to buy the safest cars because they fear 
liability, they will encourage competition among manufacturers to improve 
the safety of the cars they make for companies.92 
Second, the companies will reap a substantial benefit from putting 
AVs on the road, but in doing so the companies create the risk that the cars 
may malfunction and cause an accident.93 Because the companies are 
 
89 Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving 
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247, 252. 
90 See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 4, at 281; see also Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–
29.  
91 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 9–11.  
92 Car companies already tout safety ratings to woo customers. See, e.g., Advancing the Future 
of Safety, TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/letsgoplaces/safety-innovations/ [http://perma.cc/WNC6-
V82A]; see also Jerry Hirsch, Upstart Tesla Wins Top U.S. Safety Rating; What Will Competitors Do?, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/20/autos/la-fi-hy-tesla-nhtsa-safety-
rating-20130820 [http://perma.cc/7SQL-TNKG]. The only difference, then, will be that car-sharing 
companies, instead of individuals, will be the buyers that manufacturers must woo. 
93 How Auto Insurance Companies Calculate Risk, DMV.ORG, http://www.dmv.org/
insurance/how-auto-insurance-companies-calculate-risk.php#How-Do-Auto-Insurance-Companies-
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willing to take this risk in the name of making a profit, they should also pay 
the costs when the harm from this risk occurs. This is seen in other areas 
where a company profits from unsafe activities.94 Holding a company liable 
for its product is not unfamiliar to consumers, so holding the car-sharing 
company liable likely would be seen as more just than blaming drivers.95 
Additionally, in other areas of personal injury law, ownership of an 
unsafe instrumentality can be sufficient to find liability when that 
instrumentality causes harm.96 When an instrumentality harms others, the 
owner is punishable based on his or her status as owner, and it is 
unnecessary to find any particular actions by him that caused the harm.97 It 
is well within current tort jurisprudence to place liability on the companies 
based solely on their status as owner. 
That being said, car-sharing companies are most similar to car-rental 
companies, and the law currently shields car-rental companies from 
liability.98 There is clear legislative intent, expressed through the Graves 
Amendment, to protect car-rental companies from liability, and holding 
car-sharing companies liable for all accidents involving their cars runs 
directly counter to that intent.99 
However, there is a question of whether the Graves Amendment’s 
reasoning still applies when the cars are no longer human-operated. The 
legislative history shows that Congress intended to shield rental companies 
from liability because the negligence of the driver of the car, and not any 
action of the rental company, caused accidents and injuries.100 Therefore, if 
the driver is no longer negligent (because she is in an AV), that rationale 
for shielding companies loses much of its strength. 
Another drawback to holding the companies liable is it may make the 
business of car-sharing cost prohibitive. The cost of maintaining high levels 
 
Calculate-Risk [http://perma.cc/JPV6-9HWQ] (stating that companies consider people who drive more 
a higher risk). 
94 See, e.g., Chavez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (holding 
railroad company strictly liable because it participated in transporting dangerous explosives as part of 
its business); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) (listing factors for determining 
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous). 
95 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. 
96 See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 13, at 467–71 (discussing strict liability on canine owners 
for harm (such as dog bites) done by the owned animal, and how this policy could be extended to AV 
owners). 
97 Id. 
98 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012). 
99 Several courts have applied the shield to Zipcar, so the intent to protect extends to car-
sharing companies. See Moreau v. Josaphat, 975 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Minto v. Zipcar 
N.Y., Inc., No. 15401/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010). 
100 See Carton v. GMAC, 611 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that Congress had “clear 
intent to forestall suits” against rental companies who did not cause the accident). 
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of insurance to cover every accident from a malfunction of one of their cars 
may be too high to make the business worth pursuing.101 For car-sharing to 
occur large-scale, many new car-sharing companies will need to arise.102 
High insurance costs may prevent new companies from forming, which 
will, in turn, prevent widespread AV use.103 
C. Manufacturers 
Placing liability on the manufacturers of the new AV technology has 
received the most support in the debate over liability.104 The biggest reason 
that manufacturers are targeted for liability is they are in the best position 
to improve the technology and decrease future malfunctions.105 Of all the 
involved actors, the manufacturers are the most likely to be at fault for AV 
accidents.106 If society desires to continue a fault-based system of liability 
for car accidents, blaming manufacturers would fit best. 
An additional benefit to manufacturer liability is that the preexisting 
legal framework of products liability is already prepared to address the 
issues presented. Unlike personal injury law, which would have to adapt its 
definition of “operator” to fit with a car that operates itself, products 
liability law already addresses accidents that result from car defects.107 
Resolving disputes over a car’s defects would be more within the current 
competency of judges. Furthermore, society already accepts that car 
manufacturers can be held strictly liable for defects in their products.108 
Thus, even in cases where the AV manufacturer is not negligent, there 
 
101 This argument is most often made in relation to the danger that manufacturers will not 
create the technology because of fear of liability costs, but the same fears would be created in car-
sharing companies if they were held solely liable. See Mele, supra note 85, at 42. 
102 Currently, Zipcar is the most popular car-sharing company, yet it only has cars in twenty-
five major cities. ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ [http://perma.cc/ZG4H-UB5J]. 
103 Keeping insurance costs low would have a similar effect as limiting recovery under 
worker’s compensation schemes. Both reduce the cost for businesses of participating in areas where 
they expose themselves to liability. For a description of how this works in worker’s compensation, see 
William R. Kraus, How “Exclusive” is “Exclusive”? The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act and 
Compensatory Damages in Discrimination Cases, 43 A.F. L. REV. 145, 150 (1997). 
104 See, e.g., KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 20; Gurney, supra note 89, at 271; Marchant & 
Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–29; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280–81. 
105 Mele, supra note 85, at 42 (“[D]evelopers of software and computer systems, if exposed to 
greater liability, will have a greater incentive to create safer products, and are in the best position to 
prevent harmful security breaches in the first place.”). 
106 See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 20–21. 
107 See supra Part II for a discussion of products liability. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280.  
108 See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 26; Garza, supra note 13, at 600. 
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would be less aversion to applying strict liability on manufacturers than on 
riders or car-sharing companies.109 
As it was for drivers and the car-sharing companies, the first option 
would be to make manufacturers pay for all damages. The costs could also 
be shared in a variety of other ways. Each manufacturer could be 
responsible for damages to the car it manufactured and the people in it, 
regardless of which car in the accident actually malfunctioned. Or the 
manufacturer of the at-fault car could pay for everything except medical 
bills of its own passengers, which would be paid for by first-party 
insurance. Many ways exist to split the cost while still holding the 
manufacturer predominantly liable. 
Holding the manufacturer liable has fewer drawbacks on the fairness 
front because the manufacturer is in the best position to improve quality of 
the product and is most at fault for a defect.110 Additionally, manufacturers 
continually improve the safety of their vehicles to avoid the high costs of 
liability, and removing these costs runs the risk of disincentivizing safety 
improvements.111 These benefits make manufacturer liability a popular 
option for AVs. 
However, the biggest problem with blaming the manufacturer is that 
companies may never make the technology if it appears too expensive.112 
There are many costs associated with being the bearer of liability: the high 
cost of insurance to cover the damages, the administrative costs of working 
with the insurance company to process claims, and any litigation costs that 
arise from disputing claims.113 If a car manufacturer knows that it will incur 
these costs if it creates AVs, it may decide that producing AVs is cost 
prohibitive.114 Incentivizing the creation and use of these safer vehicles 
 
109 Compare ANDERSON et al., supra note 53, at 3 (lack of support for a no-fault system for 
drivers in accidents), with KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 26 (support for strict liability for 
manufacturers of cars in products defects cases). 
110 Mele, supra note 85, at 42.  
111 Id. See discussion infra Part IV describing how a National Car Insurance Fund will still 
incentivize manufacturers to improve AV safety. 
112 In other circumstances, liability has led manufacturers to choose not to create a product. For 
example, fear of liability led some vaccine manufacturers to cease manufacturing vaccines. Congress 
passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, creating a no-fault compensation system, to 
encourage vaccine creation and entry into the market. Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 344 (2011). 
113 See Cost of Auto Crashes & Statistics, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INS. INFO. ASS’N, 
http://www.rmiia.org/auto/traffic_safety/Cost_of_crashes.asp [http://perma.cc/TM57-SGA6]; see also 
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Costs of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD 
HIGHLIGHTS, Jan. 2013, at 1.  
114 Mele, supra note 85, at 42; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 281. 
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should be a goal of whichever liability system is chosen, and placing too 
heavy a burden on manufacturers will frustrate that goal.115 
IV. SHARING THE COSTS: A NEW NATIONAL INSURANCE FUND 
Riders, car-sharing companies, and AV manufacturers will all benefit 
from increased use of AVs, and because there is no clear reason to place all 
liability on one versus the other, the best solution is to create a no-fault 
system and have everyone split the costs of damages. Under this system, 
legislation would bar all personal injury suits from accidents where all of 
the cars involved are AVs, not just those accidents below a certain damages 
threshold. Instead, those with damages would turn to a National Car 
Insurance Fund (the Fund) for recovery. 
A. Potential Ways to Set up an Insurance Fund 
There are several ways that a large-scale insurance fund paid for by all 
actors could be run. This Note suggests that the best solution is operation 
by a federal agency. However, state-run and private insurance funds will 
also be briefly discussed. 
1. The Federally Run National Car Insurance Fund.—The Fund 
would work similarly to how Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 
contributions to Social Security and Medicare operate now. FICA 
contributions are removed from employee paychecks each month and 
placed into trust funds for both Medicare and Social Security.116 Those who 
qualify for Social Security or Medicare benefits can then apply to receive 
payments from the funds.117 Many employees will never use the money, but 
it is there for everyone who needs it.118 A governmental agency is in charge 
of both processing the claims for benefits and paying the appropriate 
amount to claimants. For example, the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) processes claims for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI),119 
whereas Health and Human Services oversees Medicare.120 
 
115 See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 22. 
116 Dave Roos, How FICA Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://money.
howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/personal-income-taxes/fica.htm [http://perma.cc/QF7J-V7XD]. 
117 See, e.g., Disability Determination Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/
disability/determination.htm [http://perma.cc/5Z6M-EYXY]. 
118 See Roos, supra note 116. 
119 Benefits for People with Disabilities, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
[http://perma.cc/6N8Q-TT5V]. 
120 HHS Programs and Services, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/programs/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/6CF9-X3HL]. 
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The Fund would operate in the same way. Riders, car-sharing 
companies, and manufacturers would all contribute through taxes and in 
proportion to how much they benefit from the use of AVs. The money 
would be stored in a trust fund and overseen by a department created within 
the NHTSA. Anyone who suffers damages from an AV accident would file 
a claim with the NHTSA department, who would review the claim and dole 
out payments. 
Manufacturers would contribute based on how many AVs they 
produce in a given year because the more cars they create and place on the 
roads, the more likely one of them will be in an accident.121 Similarly, car-
sharing companies would contribute based on the size of their fleet, 
because those with bigger fleets will be more likely to request money from 
the Fund to pay for property damages.122 Finally, riders would pay based on 
their frequency of use so that those most at risk of needing payouts will pay 
the most in taxes. Private insurance companies currently calculate a 
driver’s potential risk of accidents from a variety of factors in deciding the 
cost of premiums.123 The NHTSA could work with these private insurance 
adjusters to decide what level of taxation would be appropriate based on 
the risks each rider, company, or manufacturer pose. 
Private insurance companies also raise premiums for drivers who are 
more frequently in accidents because they cost the insurance companies 
more money in paid-out claims.124 The NHTSA could make the same 
determinations. Initially, all manufacturers and car-sharing companies 
would pay at the same rate per car. However, if a particular manufacturer’s 
or company’s cars are involved in accidents more frequently than the 
average rate, their tax rates would be increased.125 This would appropriately 
incentivize manufacturers to increase their products’ safety, and car-sharing 
companies to purchase the safest cars.126 It would also ensure that those 
 
121 Cf. How Auto Insurance Companies Calculate Risk, supra note 93 (showing that insurance 
rates are calculated based on risk of accident and premiums increase when the risk for accident is 
higher, such as for vehicles driven in heavy traffic areas where accidents are more likely). 
122 See id. 
123 Id. (factors include age, sex, occupation, place of residence, etc.); How Your Car Insurance 
Rate is Determined, ESURANCE, http://www.esurance.com/car-insurance-info/how-car-insurance-rates-
are-calculated [http://perma.cc/5T99-R5LA]. 
124 How Your Car Insurance Rate is Determined, supra note 123 (“A good rule of thumb: the 
cleaner your driving record, the lower your premium.”). 
125 The rate could be raised for riders, too, based on how many times they need to file a claim. 
However, because riders are in a worse position to increase the safety of the car they happen to ride in 
than either car-sharing companies or manufacturers are, the argument to raise a rider’s tax level for 
frequent involvement in accidents is weaker. 
126 See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 407 (fear of paying damages acts to deter others from 
similar future misconduct). This increase in payment would help address the concern, discussed in Part 
III, that removing manufacturer liability would reduce incentives to steadily improve safety features. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
824 
companies whose vehicles had the most accidents, and therefore used the 
Fund most often, paid more into the Fund. 
The NHTSA would create particular requirements for what must be 
sent to them as part of filing a claim. This is similar to the SSA process for 
SSDI applications, which requires the applicant to provide specific medical 
records that prove disability.127 For injured riders, the NHTSA would 
require medical records showing the actual cost of treatment for injuries. 
People injured in car accidents already have to compile this information for 
either their insurance company or for litigation, so sending it to a 
governmental agency would be no greater hassle than is currently 
imposed.128 
The NHTSA would also set requirements for documentation needed 
from companies to prove property damages. This is also information that 
car owners usually must provide to their insurance company or in litigation, 
so it is not a heavy burden for companies. Companies and passengers will 
benefit because they will only have to coordinate with the governmental 
agency instead of having to coordinate with all of the people who were 
involved in an accident. Because only one insurance plan is involved (i.e., 
the Fund), resolution of accidents should be more efficient than if each 
party has its own insurance company that must coordinate with all the other 
parties. 
The NHTSA will review the claims and pay damages based on the 
information provided by claimants, as well as review adjusters’ tables 
about how much certain injuries cost.129 An appeals process would be in 
place, where claimants can send additional information or have an 
administrative hearing if they feel that the agency did not award the proper 
amount.130 Because no one is truly “at fault” for the accident, the agency 
would follow the lead of no-fault systems and only award compensatory 
damages rather than punitive damages.131 In establishing the Fund, 
Congress will need to determine which economic and noneconomic losses 
 
127 See, e.g., Disability Determination Process, supra note 117. 
128 See How GEICO Investigates a Claim, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/claims/
claimsprocess/claim-investigation/ [http://perma.cc/R2T7-UX2V]; see also 4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 52, § 12.72. 
129 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1532 
(2009) (“Settlement mill negotiators and the cadre of insurance adjusters with whom they bargain come 
to a common understanding of certain injuries’ proper value.”). 
130 The appeals process could be modeled off of the one that already exists for SSDI claims. 
See Disability Determination Process, supra note 117.  
131 The point of punitive damages is to punish the person at fault, and because no one is at fault 
in AV accidents, punitive damages become unnecessary. See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 445.   
109:803 (2015) Splitting the Bill 
825 
the Fund will cover.132 Covering noneconomic losses may increase support 
for the Fund, but will also raise the overall cost and will retain some of the 
arbitrariness inherent in awarding pain and suffering. For economic losses, 
using adjusters’ tables and records from claimants will help eliminate 
arbitrary and excessive compensatory damages that often occur with jury 
trials.133 This should result in more standardized damage awards and an 
overall lowering of the cost of damages per accident. Which losses the 
Fund covers is a policy decision Congress will have to make based on 
weighing the benefits of standardization against the costs of eliminating 
pain and suffering recovery. 
2. Alternatives to a Federally Run Fund.—This section discusses two 
alternatives to the federal government creating and managing the trust 
fund: (1) a state-run fund and (2) private insurance. These alternatives 
might be more palatable to those with concerns about increasing federal 
involvement in an area that, as discussed above, has previously been 
dominated by private insurance and state law. 
The first alternative is for a state agency to create a state-run insurance 
fund. One benefit would be that instead of one federal agency dealing with 
all claims nationwide, each state would have a smaller number of claims 
that they could potentially process more efficiently. Second, a state-run 
fund would have the benefit of being a better fit for each state’s needs.134 
Each state could raise and lower the taxes on their citizens based on how 
many accidents actually occur. States could also experiment with the means 
by which they process claims to find what works best for their 
constituencies.135 With a National Fund, some states will end up paying 
more than their citizens need because the tax rate will be decided based on 
national needs.136 
 
132 Some states, in establishing a no-fault system, prevent recovery of any noneconomic losses, 
such as pain and suffering. Id. at 844. States vary with respect to which economic losses are covered. 
Michigan, for example, allows for a high level of recovery and covers all medical expenses and lost 
wages. PAUL HEATON, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AUTO INSURANCE REFORM IN MICHIGAN 1 
(2010). 
133 See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 839–41. 
134 This is the classic “laboratories of democracy” argument, which posits that states are better 
able to meet the individualized needs of their constituencies and to try out creative solutions to 
problems because they are smaller and more localized entities. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (originating the term).  
135 See id. 
136 This is already seen with other federal taxes where some states are subsidizing others. For 
example, in 2005, Mississippi received $2.02 in federal spending for every dollar it paid in federal 
taxes, whereas New Jersey received only $0.61 in federal spending. Federal Spending Received Per 
Dollar of Taxes Paid by State, 2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/federal-spending-received-dollar-taxes-paid-state-2005 [http://perma.cc/G7ZT-6D6A]. 
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However, with insurance, the more people who pay into the plan, the 
lower the premiums are for everyone.137 If a similar insurance fund were 
state-run, the taxes would be higher because there would be a smaller 
number of participants and thus less loss spreading.138 The higher the taxes, 
the less likely people will choose to switch to AVs. 
A second problem with state-run funds is the administrative burden on 
manufacturers and states. With the National Fund, the manufacturer would 
just have to determine its national taxable income from all AVs it sold and 
pay one federal tax. In contrast, with state-run funds, the manufacturer 
would have to determine its taxable income from AVs in each state where 
it sold them and then pay taxes to all of those different states. This may not 
seem like a large burden because nationwide corporations already pay taxes 
in multiple states.139 However, the benefit of only having to pay one tax, 
instead of potentially fifty, cuts in favor of the National Fund. 
Private insurance companies could also operate the funds instead of 
government-run insurance. Each private company would have one fund 
into which all of their customers pay at different rates and from which each 
customer could withdraw as needed. When there is an accident, the private 
insurance adjusters would look at the black box, review medical and 
property damage records, and allocate funds accordingly in the same way 
the federal agency would. One benefit of using private insurance is that 
private insurance companies’ adjusters are already trained to review 
claims.140 An additional benefit of private companies is that they could set 
the premiums based on the risk their customers actually posed.141 As with 
the states, the smaller plans would mean narrower tailoring. 
A drawback to private insurance is that, as with the states, the smaller 
plan will mean higher costs. Additionally, costs will likely be higher for 
private plans because the companies are for-profit. One look at the current 
health insurance system shows just how high premiums can climb when 
for-profit companies dominate the insurance scene.142 In contrast, if the 
 
137 This is seen in health insurance. See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the 
United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2005) 
(“[Insurance] functions by spreading risk across a wide range of individuals, some of whom need care 
in any given year and some of whom do not.”).  
138 The larger a plan, the lower the costs. Id. (“By offering insurance to a large number of 
individuals, it can take advantage of the likelihood that many insured individuals will pay more in 
health insurance premiums than they will require in health care costs.”). 
139 See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608–10 (1951) (each state has the 
authority to tax any corporation who conducts commerce within its boundaries). 
140 See, e.g., How GEICO Investigates a Claim, supra note 128. 
141 See How Your Car Insurance Rate is Determined, supra note 123.  
142 See generally Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health-Care Premiums Climbing Faster Than Inflation, 
Studies Say, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118951621359523764 
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Fund is the only game in town and only needs to break even, the prices will 
be lower. 
B. Benefits of Federal Agency Involvement 
As mentioned in Part III, one drawback that exists for holding drivers, 
car-sharing companies, or manufacturers liable is the possibility that 
liability would disincentivize AV use. To be a better option, the Fund must 
incentivize all actors to create, buy, and use AVs. The Fund will 
accomplish this by lowering overall accident costs below their current 
levels and decreasing the potential costs for each individual actor if they 
were held solely liable. 
As mentioned above, for insurance, the bigger the plan, the less each 
person in it has to pay. This occurs because people with a high risk of 
needing to file a claim (drivers with a history of accidents) are combined in 
the same plan with those who are unlikely to file a claim (safe drivers).143 
The more people in the plan, therefore, the more the losses that one unsafe 
driver incurs can be spread out and collected as low premiums.144 
At first glance, this system does not seem to work for insurance plans 
involving AVs because there are no longer risky or safe drivers. However, 
there are still differences that will lead to higher risk of higher losses for 
certain people. For example, people living in high-population states will be 
a greater risk because there will be more cars in the state overall, which 
means more accidents in the state.145 Additionally, places with high 
population density are likely to have more people in each shared car 
because people are more likely to live near each other and be going to the 
same place.146 An accident where four people are in the AV and are injured 
 
[http://perma.cc/Z3Q-8FRW] (“[T]he annual cost for family coverage through an employer plan is now 
more than $12,000, well over what a minimum-wage worker earns in a year.”); Alina Selyukh, Health 
Insurance Premiums Climb Faster in 2011, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/27/us-usa-health-poll-kaiser-idUSTRE78Q31820110927 
[http://perma.cc/Y3V-Z3V6] (“[T]he cost of health insurance continues to climb for companies and 
workers, with annual family premiums this year growing at a pace triple that of 2010 and outpacing 
wage increases . . . .”).  
143 Cf. Richard C. Ausness, Litigation and Compensation: Paying for the Health Costs of 
Smoking: Loss Shifting and Loss Bearing, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 537, 560 (1998) (explaining how loss 
spreading works, using smokers as an example).  
144 See id.  
145 This can be seen just by basic math. If 1% of AVs are in an accident per month, then a place 
with 1000 AVs is going to have fewer accidents than one with 1 million AVs. See also Where Car 
Accidents Happen Most, supra note 42.  
146 Carpooling is already most popular in areas with high population density, in part because 
there are enough people who live and work near each other to make the system efficient. See Nelson D. 
Chan & Susan A. Shaheen, Ridesharing in North America: Past, Present, and Future, 32 TRANSP. 
REVS. 93, 101 (2012) (stating that, for example, casual carpooling (slugging) is seen in Houston, San 
Francisco, and the D.C. suburbs). 
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will cost more than an accident with one person, so the accidents in areas 
with high population density will cost more on average. By combining 
riders, car-sharing companies, and manufacturers from small and large 
states, the National Fund will be much larger than the private insurance 
plans that currently exist and will spread the risks effectively.147 
Right now, car insurance costs vary widely, but one study showed the 
average cost can range from as little as $80 per month to as much as $213 
per month, depending on the state.148 The National Insurance Fund would 
reduce this monthly cost by having many more people paying into one 
large fund.149 Additionally, the Fund could eliminate deductibles and 
instead pay the entirety of each claim for damages.150 If this were done, any 
individual in an accident would save several hundred dollars more by 
participating in the Fund instead of private insurance. 
The taxes paid would vary based on use of the system and therefore 
differ from FICA, which uses a flat percentage for everyone’s paycheck. 
However, looking at the amount of money FICA taxes raise per year can 
show how high the taxes would need to be to cover the cost of accidents. 
Currently, 7.65% of an employee’s monthly paycheck is taken out for 
FICA taxes.151 The projected revenue from FICA taxes in 2014 is roughly 
$1.033 trillion.152 Car accidents in 2010 cost around one trillion dollars.153 
Thus, even if AVs did not reduce the number and cost of accidents at all, 
the amount the Fund would need to raise would still be less than what is 
raised by FICA taxes, so the tax rate would also be less once AV use 
becomes widespread. With manufacturers and companies also paying a 
 
147 The total number of licensed drivers needing insurance in the United States is 210 million, 
but they are spread among multiple insurance companies, like GEICO, who has only about 13 million 
policyholders. GEICO at a Glance, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/about/corporate/at-a-glance/ 
[http://perma.cc/4HTN-BX83]; Our Nation’s Highways: 2011, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm [http://perma.cc/C8QK-
K9XL].  
148 Brian Quinn, Average Cost of Insurance: Car, Home, Renters, and Pet (2015), 
VALUEPENGUIN, http://www.valuepenguin.com/average-cost-of-insurance. 
149 The calculations in the following paragraph demonstrate this further. 
150 Most private car insurance companies have a deductible that the insured must pay out of 
pocket for an accident. The amount can vary widely, so the amount saved by the Fund eliminating them 
would also vary. See Aaron Crowe, Higher Deductibles Can Save, CARINSURANCE.COM (last updated 
Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.carinsurance.com/Articles/raising-deductible-savings.aspx [http://perma.cc/
Q8EP-7NGJ] (comparing deductibles ranging from $250 to $2500).  
151 Topic 751 - Social Security and Medicare Withholding Rates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(last updated July 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html [http://perma.cc/3S3K-DDLG]. 
152 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 12 
(2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_
Feb.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EF7-Z63V]. 
153 Cost of Auto Crashes & Statistics, supra note 113.  
109:803 (2015) Splitting the Bill 
829 
good portion of the taxes, the amount the tax would need to raise from 
individual drivers would drop even lower. 
Car insurance is not the only cost associated with car accidents. 
Litigation is expensive, so each legal dispute over fault in an accident costs 
the parties substantially.154 By banning litigation and using the Fund 
exclusively, injured parties will avoid the exorbitant costs of litigation.155 
Furthermore, avoiding litigation will avoid the costs associated with 
punitive damages and excessive jury verdicts.156 Although they are not 
frequently awarded, punitive damages act as punishment for the 
defendant’s negligence in driving and do not represent any actual costs of 
the plaintiff.157 By paying only actual damages and by using set formulas to 
determine future damages, the NHTSA will reduce the costs of accidents 
and thereby reduce the needed amount in the Fund. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the NHTSA would not be trying to make 
a profit and would only need to raise enough money to pay the actual cost 
of accidents. As more AVs enter the market, fewer accidents should occur, 
and the NHTSA could lower taxes even further. Not needing to turn a 
profit allows the NHTSA to set prices that accurately reflect the amount it 
needs to pay claimants each month.158 
All of the lowered costs will be spread among the riders, car-sharing 
companies, and manufacturers, so unlike the alternatives listed in Part III, 
no one actor is getting punished more severely. Each actor should pay less 
per accident than it currently does. By reducing the financial burden on all 
actors, everyone is incentivized to create and use AVs. 
C. Barriers to Creating the Fund 
Many barriers exist to creating new, large-scale government programs. 
This Note is not suggesting that the Fund is the most likely or even a very 
feasible option, but instead is suggesting that if implemented, the Fund 
 
154 See Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 113 (stating that at the median, a senior 
attorney’s billable hours alone cost $20,763 for a full automobile tort trial, and that adding an expert 
makes the total fees per case $43,238); William A. Taylor, The Economics of a Civil Lawsuit, BUS. 
LAW. (Feb. 19, 2015), available at http://www.thebusinesslawyers.com/BBL_News_Articles/
Litigation%20Economics%20101.pdf [http://perma.cc/manage/vest/F6SZ-48YV] (stating that civil suits 
can easily cost up to $50,000).  
155 Barring suits to meet the purpose of avoiding litigation costs and larger awards is currently 
best seen in the Worker’s Compensation context. See Kraus, supra note 103, at 150.  
156 SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 447 (stating that the Supreme Court has upheld jury 
awards for punitive damages that are “more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses”). 
157 Id. at 445 (discussing the punishment and deterrence rationales for punitive damages). 
158 For example, Congress has changed FICA tax levels twenty-one times since 1935. Program 
Provisions and SSA Administrative Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
statcomps/supplement/2010/2a1-2a7.html#table2.a3 [http://perma.cc/9Q5S-6422]. 
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could solve some of the problems that arise from holding only one party 
liable for AV accidents. This Section touches on some of the biggest 
hurdles the Fund would face and recognizes that some of those hurdles may 
be insurmountable. 
As anyone who has read the news about the Affordable Care Act 
knows, many members of the public do not like government involvement 
in areas that they see as better suited for private business.159 The same 
concerns about excessive federal government involvement will likely meet 
any proposal for replacement of private car insurance with a national 
version. However, not all large government programs are as disliked as the 
Affordable Care Act. For example, support for Social Security and 
Medicare was fairly high in recent public polling.160 Additionally, despite 
frequent public criticism, Congress did pass the Affordable Care Act, and it 
has remained on the books since 2010.161 Therefore, negative public 
opinion is not always an insurmountable hurdle to Congress dramatically 
increasing a governmental program, and the Fund could gain enough 
support to pass in Congress. 
Lobbying against the National Car Insurance Fund, in contrast, may 
be an insurmountable hurdle. As shown by recent attempts to pass gun 
control legislation, even when public opinion is staunchly in favor of 
specific legislative actions, powerful lobbying interests can prevent 
action.162 Private car insurance companies will lose substantial business as 
more people use AVs and rely on the Fund instead. Personal injury 
plaintiff’s attorneys and insurance defense attorneys will also lose business 
if legislation bars lawsuits. Lawyers and insurance companies have 
 
159 See, e.g., Michael McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: Reps. Louie 
Gohmert, Steve King Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Mar. 20, 2014, 7:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-steve-king_n_138397
3.html [http://perma.cc/ZPP6-E73]; O’Reilly: ‘ObamaCare Is Part of the Socialist Vision for America,’ 
FOXNEWS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://foxnewsinsider.com/2013/10/22/oreilly-obamacare-
part-socialist-vision-america [http://perma.cc/742X-44NE].  
160 Stephanie Condon, Poll: Most Americans Say Medicare Is Worth the Cost (Apr. 21, 2011, 
8:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-americans-say-medicare-is-worth-the-cost/ [http://
perma.cc/9WNV-DR9P]; Jason Sattler, POLL: Clear Majority Want No Medicare, Social Security or 
Education Cuts (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/poll-clear-majority-want-no-
medicare-social-security-or-education-cuts/ [http://perma.cc/7P98-AQ22]. 
161 See Health Care that Works for Americans, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview [http://perma.cc/Q3KV-KSXA]. 
162 After the Newtown shootings, 71% of those polled supported a federal database tracking 
gun sales, and 65% supported banning high-capacity ammunition magazines. Gary Langer, After 
Newtown Shootings, Most Back Some Gun Controls, Poll Shows, ABC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013, 5:00 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/01/on-eve-of-newtown-recommendations-most-back-new-
gun-control-measures/ [http://perma.cc/66M3-4SXB]. But gun control measures failed in Congress. 
Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate; Obama, in Defeat, Sees ‘Shameful Day,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1. 
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substantial capital and will be willing to spend large amounts to try and 
prevent creation of the Fund.163 One potential solution would be for 
NHTSA to contract out the day-to-day administration of the Fund to private 
insurance companies to prevent the companies from going out of business 
and ensure they get on board.164 Most legislation has winners and losers, so 
just because the Fund would harm some sectors does not necessarily mean 
it cannot be created. 
Legislators and the public may also not initially support the Fund 
because of the view of government as slow, burdensome, and full of red 
tape that will bog down claims.165 This opinion of the government is not 
necessarily supported by the numbers. The typical Medicare claim takes an 
average of only 30 days to process,166 but the typical initial application for 
Social Security Disability Insurance can take 90 to 120 days to process.167 
Claims with private car insurance, can vary anywhere from a couple days 
to 60 days to process.168 Based on this evidence, sometimes the government 
is faster and sometimes it is slower than private companies in processing 
information. What is important for passing legislation, however, is public 
opinion about how slowly the government operates, and therefore the 
actual amount of time the Fund will take to process claims is irrelevant. 
Proponents could build in statutorily required deadlines for processing 
claims or attempt to emulate Medicare’s faster procedures to assure the 
 
163 Lobbying by private insurers against legislation was recently seen in the fight against the 
Affordable Care Act. Chris McGreal, Revealed: Millions Spent by Lobby Firms Fighting Obama Health 
Reforms, GUARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/01/lobbyists-millions-
obama-healthcare-reform [http://perma.cc/L4TC-T2KR] (health industry and interest groups spent $380 
million); Rick Ungar, Busted! Health Insurers Secretly Spent Huge To Defeat Health Care Reform 
While Pretending To Support Obamacare, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 8:37 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/06/25/busted-health-insurers-secretly-spent-huge-to-defeat
-health-care-reform-while-pretending-to-support-obamacare/ [http://perma.cc/HS8K-W4B9]. 
164 But contracting out may actually cost more, which could harm the Fund’s purpose of 
keeping everyone’s costs lower than they are with private car insurance now. See Ron Nixon, 
Government Pays More in Contracts, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A16. 
165 Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Theory of Misgovernance, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1289, 1289 (1997); Emily 
Ekins, Poll: Majority of Americans Say the Government Is Burdensome and Impedes Them, 
REASON.COM (Dec. 12, 2013, 1:31PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/12/poll-majority-of-americans-
say-the-gove2 [http://perma.cc/KS8T-9KTL] (“Americans think government, while necessary for 
certain functions, is generally burdensome and impedes them more than helps them.”). 
166 How Medicare Part A & B Claims Are Processed, CAL. HEALTH ADVOCS. (last updated 
Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/billing/ab-processed.html [http://perma.cc/QK35-
A8B5]. 
167 Tim Moore, Applying for Disability - How Long Does It Take to Get Social Security 
Disability or SSI Benefits?, SSDRC, http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestions1-46.html [http://perma.
cc/6J96-TL7E]. 
168 How Long Does it Take to Receive an Insurance Claim Check?, CARSDIRECT (June 25, 
2013), http://www.carsdirect.com/car-insurance/how-long-does-it-take-to-receive-an-insurance-claim-
check [http://perma.cc/JXY4-R7LY]. 
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public that their claims will be processed as quickly as with private 
insurance. In addition to concerns about how long claims will take to 
process, there will likely also be apprehension about how long the initial 
startup will take and what initial kinks there will be. Statutory deadlines 
could also help assuage these anxieties. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this Note focuses on how to 
structure insurance once AV use is widespread, and leaves to future 
discussion the problems of the transition period from human-operated cars 
to AVs. However, it is worth noting that one final problem with 
implementing the Fund is the negative impact it will have on those who do 
not switch to AV use. As more people use AVs and the Fund, fewer people 
will be left buying private car insurance. The private companies will have 
to substantially raise premiums on all remaining customers in order to 
remain solvent and compensate for lost business.169 As demand for private 
insurance falls, the number of suppliers of insurance will also fall, and 
those who still want private insurance will not benefit from multiple 
companies competing for the best prices.170 On the one hand, promoters of 
universal AV use may want this because it will make continued use of the 
more dangerous human-operated cars economically infeasible. But in the 
short-term, fear of skyrocketing insurance prices for those who do not want 
to use AVs could be another source of public disapproval of the Fund. One 
option is for the government to provide short-term subsidies to those still 
using human-operated cars during the transition period to help avoid public 
outcry against the Fund. These subsidies should be short-term so that 
drivers are still compelled economically to switch to the safer AVs within a 
reasonable timeframe. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note does not profess to have all of the answers on how to 
overcome the various barriers to creating the Fund. It does suggest, 
however, that the federal government start planning for when AVs enter the 
market. Although robot cars seem like something out of a futuristic movie, 
 
169 Robert W. Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s 
Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1381 (2012) (discussing how the insurance 
companies will increase premiums for human-operated cars to compensate for losses in premiums for 
AV riders).  
170 It has been a long-running rule of economics that more competition drives down prices, and 
this has been seen recently in the health insurance debates. See Geoffrey Cowley, New Signs that 
Obamacare is Lowering Insurance Costs, MSNBC (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/new-signs-obamacare-lowering-insuranc [http://perma.cc/RJW9-
NELS] (explaining that the individual mandate creates a bigger market which forces private companies 
to compete for customers by lowering costs). 
109:803 (2015) Splitting the Bill 
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Google already has many AVs up and running, and major car companies 
are looking to add AVs to their fleets within the next ten years.171 
Legislators must start now to decide how best to distribute liability and 
costs for accidents involving AVs. The government has an interest in 
promoting the use of AVs, but for manufacturers to feel secure in releasing 
these cars and for drivers to feel secure in using them, there will need to be 
a system in place for addressing accidents. Creation of a no-fault system 
coupled with a National Car Insurance Fund is at least one option for 
legislators to consider moving forward. 
  
 
171 See Knight, supra note 5; Lavrinc, supra note 5. 
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